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Abstract
A tenure system, viewed holistically, is in effect a dynamic 
resource system consisting of a diversity of resource processes 
and rules, roqulations, rights and obligations that define the 
relationship between the resource users and the resources as well 
as between themselves. The resource system is essentially 
conditioned by the tenure regime that governs the resources that 
are utilised in the resource processes. In common property 
regimes, the development of common property management units is 
related to and determined by the patterns of resource use. As 
such, the locus of control over decisions affecting the 
exploitation of those resources should be expected to be as close 
as possible to those people actually involved in their 
exploitation. However, since the advent of colonialism in Africa, 
decisions affecting the exploitation of resources by small rural 
communities are increasingly made in bureaucratic institutions 
far removed from the consequences of their actions. Numerous 
evidence can however be adduced to demonstrate that the survival 
of biological resources is best managed at the local level. 
Moreover, and particularly in the case of Sub - Saharan Africa, 
resources have been exploited in the interests and according to 
the designs of the rich industrialised North, resulting in 
patently unsuitable land use systems and institutions. The 
cumulative negative effect of bureaucratic control and externally 
imposed land use systems is evidenced by an apparently inexorable 
trend towards resource degradation and depletion, diminished 
capacity to guarantee food security and the general destruction 
of common property resources in most of Sub - Saharan Africa. 
These processes are frequently attributed to the "tragedy of the 
commons" and the policy solution suggested in this paradigm is 
privatisation of the commons. This paper attempts to show that, 
on the contrary, the re - institution of appropriate local 
control and management of biological resources in common property 
regimes will be the decisive factor in reversing the trend of 
degradation. The primary focus will be on the management of 
wildlife resources under common property regimes.
A system of tenure has been defined as "... simply a bundle of 
rights,..., rights to use land,trees and their products in 
certain ways and sometimes to exclude others" (Bruce and 
Fortmann, 1988:2). The system basically defines the rights and 
obligations of an individual or group regarding certain resources 
governed by that system. Three distinct tenure regimes, or 
property rights systems, have been distinguished as follows: 
"freehold", "leasehold" and "communal" or "traditional" tenure. 
Tenure systems are not necessarily mutually exclusive and 
sometimes coexist within the same production system. "...it is 
not at all unusual for a village to have a certain tenure over a 
piece of land, while an individual or family has tenure over part 
of the same land, and the state asserts a residual title in the 
same land" (Bruce and Fortmann, 1989:2). A fourth tenure regime, 
or rather the absence of any clear system of rights and 
obligations, open access, can also be identified as a distinct 
tenure system.
Private property refers to the individual's right to exclude 
others from a resource or resources. Common property refers to 
the individual's right not to be excluded from the group's 
resources. State property refers to the right of the state to 
exclude individuals or groups of individuals from some resource 
or resources.
A common property regime is thus based on some concept of equal 
access to a resource by all members of a clearly defined group. 
Group membership is strictly defined either in lineage or 
residence terms or by some other criteria that is understood and 
accepted by all group members and non members. Communal tenure 
thus defines a common property regime.
Communal tenure, indeed all tenure regimes, are dynamic 
institutions that are always changing in response to changes in 
their environments. Some of these changes are in response to 
external circumstances rather than to any internal dynamics 
within the system itself. It has been demonstrated for instance 
that the communal land tenure system existing in Zimbabwe today 
is more an artifact of colonial interventions than the result of 
internal dynamics within that system (Cheater,1990) . It is also 
evident that the tenure system pertaining to most resources in 
Zimbabwe were politically determined to protect the interest of 
certain groups while at the same time depriving others of access 
to those resources. This paper will focus primarily on the tenure 
system regarding wildlife resources.
Communal tenure has been indicted for inevitably leading to 
resource degradation because of its inability to control the 
behaviour of individuals within that group regarding the 
utilisation of the group's common resources. The chief architect 
of this position is Hardin who advanced the "Tragedy of the 
Commons" paradigm whose basic premise is that individuals will 
attempt to maximise their benefit from common properties at the
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expense of the resources themselves and the group as a whole. 
The main critics of this position point out that it really 
defines an open access regime rather than common property. These 
critics, (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; Lawry, 1988,89; 
Ostrom, 1907;), note that any common property regime by 
implication also refers to the existence of some institutional 
arrangement to regulate both access to the commons and the rights 
/ and obligations of individuals within the group regarding the 
- commons. It is also pointed out that due to the introduction of 
foreign norms regarding the utilisation of these resources, such 
institutional arrangements have everywhere atrophied through 
desuetude (Lawry, 1909; Marks, 1984; Berry, 1989; Scoones and 
Wilson,1909).
( The response of local people to the expropriation of hitherto 
/ common properties has inevitably been to exploit these on an 
individual basis, in other words the substitution of state 
property for common property has at the same time introduced the 
rationality of open access to local communities. In the case of 
wildlife, exploitation has tended to take the form of "stealing" 
the resource from the state by individuals whenever they can 
(Murphree,1990) . One can also speculate that a certain class of 
individuals specialising in poaching has come into existence and 
that these engage in various forms of exchange with other 
members of the group who do not have similar access or for 
various reasons can not engage in poaching.
Local responses to new definitions of common property have varied 
from attempts on the part of the rich peasantry to expropriate 
and privatise the commons, thus beginning a process of 
/ proletarianisation that is disguised by several factors, 
(Cheater, 1989; Ranger, 1989; Murombedzi, 1990) to attempts on 
the part of a section of the peasantry to expropriate private 
land through "squatting".
At the same time, a process of differentiation is occurring among 
the peasantry. This process dates back to colonial and pre­
colonial times but has obviously been accelerated by independence 
and the introduction of increased access to markets, credit 
facilities arid cash income remittances for some peasant 
households (Jackson and Collier, 1988; Amin, 3990; Scoones and 
Wilson, 1989; Cousins 1990). Such differentiation inevitably 
results in a redefinition of individuals' relationships with 
common properties.
All those processes thus point to the need to redefine 
individuals' and groups' rights to common properties if the 
current trend of degradation and decimation is to be halted and 
reversed. The search for solutions should be predicated upon the 
recognition that viewed in proper perspective, the problem of 
resource degradation is in essence the problem of the unnatural 
death of common property management institutions. To emphasize 
this point, I will briefly trace the historical origins and 
functions of common property institutions and how they served to 
regulate sustainable utilization of the resources. Next I will
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show how colonialism destroyed these institutions and how 
resource degradation inevitably resulted. Finally, this should 
enable some conclusion that demonstrates the need for 
reintroducing appropriate local level common property resource 
management institutions in Zimbabwe's communal lands.
A fundamental assumption running through this paper is that the 
tenure system in the so called communal areas is still 
essentially "communal" and that there are no immediate plans to 
change this. I also assume that it is the intention of policy 
makers to increase the ability of this communal system of tenure 
to manage common property resources on a sustainable basis.
The role of common property resource management institutions in
communal tenure regimes
While evidence exists to suggest that the tenure system 
prevailing in the "Communal Lands" (CLs) today is dynamic and 
undergoing numerous changes (Cheater 1990; Murombedzi 1990; 
Ranger 1989), it is not my purpose here to discuss the tenure 
system per se, suffice it to mention that the guiding assumption 
in this paper is that the system has elements of communal tenure 
regarding access to certain "key" resources such as grazing, 
water and woodland etc.
The tenure system that was encouraged by the colonisers was 
essentially "communal" although in effect the colonial state had 
taken over ownership of all "tribal land" Ranger (1985;1989). 
Other writes have also argued that the designation "communal" 
with reference to the tenure system existing in Zimbabwe's so 
called "Communal Lands" is not only inappropriate but also a 
result of the "ideologization of the land issue" by the colonial^ 
authorities which has been continued by the post independence 
administration because it serves the interests of the ruling 
class (vide e.g. cheater 1989; .1990 for a fuller discussion of 
"communal tenure" in Zimbabwe).
The problems of resource degradation in the CLs today have been 
well documented (Moyana, 1984; Cliffe, 1988; Scoones, 1987; etc). 
A major cause of this degradation is the colonial system of 
concentrating people on marginal land to curtail their 
agricultural productivity and force them into wage labour. 
However, a political economy approach is not sufficient to 
explain the lack of local responses and solutions to resource 
degradation. A fuller explanation is to be found in the effect 
of the colonial system on local institutions' ability to regulate 
access to and utilization of common property resources. Wilson 
(1988) documents the extent of environmental knowledge among the 
peasantry of Manvihwa in Zvishavane district and demonstrates how 
this knowledge was not applied in conservation because of the 
inability of government institutions and extension agencies to, 
incorporate appropriate local technical knowledge into their 
programmes.
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The problems of managing common properties under communal tenure 
regimes are familiar to students of the "Commons" debate Hardin 
(1068). In this thesis, Hardin maintains that all common 
properties will inevitably be degraded because of the failure of 
communal tenure regimes to ensure rational utilization. 
According to Hardin, the rational herdsman in a communal tenure 
regime will invest in more livestock at the expense of the 
rangelands and without regard to the actions of other herdsmen 
using the same commons. The benefits of the resultant 
degradation are greater to the individual herdsman than the costs 
which are borne by the whole group. Critics of the commons 
paradigm argue that Hardin is essentially writing about a 
situation of open access rather than a communal tenure regime 
that specifically limits access to the resource in question to a 
clearly defined group of persons, with clearly defined rights and 
obligations regarding their utilization of the resource.
Ostrom defines institutional arrangements as: "... the rules in 
use by a community to determine who has access to common pool 
resources, what use-units authorised participants can consume and 
at what times, and who will monitor and enforce these rules" 
(Ostrom, 1987; in McCkay and Acheson (eds),1987). Hence an 
institutional arrangement refers not only to a constituted body 
of persons but also to a prescribed constitution to guide its 
activities.
The policy solution suggested in the tragedy of the commons is 
the allocation of full private property rights to a set of 
individuals. Privatisation constitutes an institutional 
arrangement that allocates regulatory authority to the 
individual. Critics of the tragedy of the commons argue that 
privatisation will not necessarily solve the problems of common 
property resources, rather it will institute a different tenure 
regime.
Ciriacy - Wantrup and Bishop (1975) maintain that common property 
regimes do not necessarily imply the absence of control, rights 
or obligations. On the contrary, such regimes usually develop 
institutions that are specifically designed to regulate the 
utilization of the resources that fall under the jurisdiction of 
that regime. Such institutions also promise to be central to the 
solutions of today's pressing resource problems.
Berry (forthcoming) argues that the imposition of one economic 
system over another necessarily leads to the subjugation of all 
existing institutions and the creation of ones more suitable to 
serving the needs of the new economic system. Colonialism in 
Africa led to the institution of colonial economies that were 
designed to benefit the interests of the colonising classes. In 
the Zimbabwean context, local populations were relegated to 
increasingly smaller and congested reserves to make way for 
European agriculture and to create labour reserves for the 
nascent colonial industries (Arrighi,1970; Bates, 1983; Beinart 
et al., 1986; Olson, 1985)
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Thus the resources of the colonised nations and regions have been 
exploited primarily to satisfy the needs of the industrialised 
North, and the institutions that have been developed to 
facilitate and sustain this process are necessarily based on the 
experiences of the North. Marks (1984), referring to the effect 
of colonialism on wildlife utilization in Zambia, writes that:
"Many of the institutional forms and concepts developed in 
Northern Europe for the conservation of temperate fauna are 
inimical to the circumstances of the tropics and their 
different ecological, political, social and cultural 
constraints". (1904:xii).
For Marks wildlife conservation should be defined within the 
context of human ecological problems. The imposition of colonial 
institutions has however shifted the locus of control over 
resources from those communities whose survival depends on them, 
and are thus best placed to conserve them, to far removed 
institutions whose interests are not necessarily beneficial to 
the resource. As Marks puts it:
"... decisions affecting wildlife survival and the welfare 
of small - scale rural societies, often existing on the same 
terrain, are increasingly made in bureaucratic institutions 
far removed from the consequences of their actions. ... the 
survival of biological resources, such as wildlife, is best 
managed at the local level. In this view, the welfare of 
indigenous peoples and the management of their resources are 
linked directly." (1984;xiii).
Bromley and Cernea note that the dissolution of common property 
management institutions at the local level through the imposition 
of state ownership, rather than any inherent unsuitability of the 
communal system of tenure, is to be blamed for the degradation of 
most common property resources. In their words:
"Resource degradation in developing countries, while 
incorrectly attributed to "common property resources", 
actually originates in the dissolution of local 
institutional arrangements whose very purpose was to give 
rise to resource use patterns that were sustainable. The 
dissolution of local institutional arrangements arose from 
a combination of powerful rulers at some remove from the 
village, colonial administration, and the rise of the nation 
state. National governments have not replaced these former 
resource management regimes" (Bromley and Cernea, 
1988)(emphasis added).
Lawry (1989) observes that the imposition of state ownership and 
control results in local institutions losing their legal rights 
to control local resource use. At the same time, the state, 
because of logistical limitations of staff and funding, is unable 
to put effective management systems in place. The emergence of 
local solutions to future resource management problems is also 
effectively forestalled in the process.
"... the state's principal objective in centralising control 
[is] to assert its political authority over local interests, 
not to impose new resource management regimes. States have 
concentrated their regulatory efforts on individual users, 
not on local user groups" (Lawry, 1989:5).
The need for a management regime that focuses on user groups 
rather than individual users is thus demonstrated. In the case 
of wildlife, the effect of state control has been the emergence 
of utilization forms based on individual ability to evade 
detection by the state agencies. The state's ability to regulate 
this form of utilisation has reached the limit of its capacity 
and the state is now forced to seek new and alternative forms of 
wildlife utilisation in the communal areas. In Marks' words:
"Once in place, protective laws and institutions obtained 
their own momentum and continue today to the point where, as 
a strategy, they have reached the limits of traditional 
skills and resources" (Marks, 1984;12).
£>The CAMPFIRE programme is one such initiative that is based on a 
recognition of the need for group ownership and control as the 
most viable regulatory mechanism and one that can best ensure' 
sustainable utilisation. It goes without saying that the success 
of Campfire will, in the final analysis, be determined by the 
extent to which the programme 'is able to create viable local 
management institutions.
Thus the policy solution to the current problems of common 
property resources lies in the development of an appropriate 
institutional framework through which clearly defined user groups 
can regulate resource utilization and exclude non users from the 
benefit of their common resources. As Lawry concludes: "... the 
devolution of greater management control to local user - groups 
is a broadly desirable policy goal" (1908:18).
Since the basic management problem identified here is the 
inherent unsuitability of western institutions and management 
style, the resource degradation problem is, therefore, also a 
crisis for the western management style and perception of 
sustainable utilization. Hence a change in western perceptions 
of local resources has to be an integral part of any solution to 
common property problems. Of particular importance in the 
present context is the need for local bureaucratic and technical 
staff to realign their perceptions of local capabilities to 
manage their own resources.
"At issue here is the survival of species, but also at stake 
is the survival of the Northern way of viewing wild animals 
and the survival of a way of life that seeks to create and 
exploit wealth rather than one that seeks to live within the 
confines of environmental limits." (Marks 1984;6: from 
Marnhem 1960) .
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Colonial institutions were superimposed on local institutions to 
service the needs of the new colonial economic system. The 
result was that local institutions that had worked so well to 
ensure rational utilization and equitable access to resources 
atrophied through desuetude since they were no longer relevant to 
the new system. The colonial institutions thus substituted did 
not however have the capacity to regulate access to and 
utilization of common properties and thus could not generate 
appropriate local level responses to the resource degradation 
problems triggered by the concentration of large numbers of 
people and livestock on marginal land and by new forms of 
allocation and access to resources.
Moreover, colonial policies and institutions were viewed by local 
populations as being designed to negate their own achievements 
and intentions and thus were resisted. This was particularly 
true of "traditional" institutions that were maintained by the 
Eritish colonial administrations in their system of indirect rule 
(Berry, forthcoming). Consequently, the colonial authorities 
found it necessary to enforce and police their policies in the 
face of this local resistance. As Graham expresses it:
" Wildlife protection, like other imposed policies, has 
always carried with it the implications of force, of quasi- 
inilitary operations, and of sanctions" (Graham, 1973 ) .
Thus colonial regulation of access to and utilisation of 
resources was not consensual but rather coercive. Given such a 
situation, local regulatory institutions were rendered 
ineffective and in effect were deliberately demobilised and 
disbanded by the colonial system except where they served the 
interests of the system.
Thus while the structural inability of the communal lands to 
support the human and livestock populations were evident to the 
residents of the communal areas, local solutions were not 
forthcoming. This suggests that the problem was the inability of 
the new local institutions (created by the colonial government) 
to respond to the problem of resource degradation in a 
satisfactory way. This would also further suggest that the 
solution would be to create more appropriate institutions at the 
local level that ensure the participation of all concerned in the 
regulation of the utilization of common property resources. For 
a fuller discussion of the political economy of common property 
resource degradation in colonial Zimbabwe see Murombedzi (1990).
Local Level Common Property Institutions and the Problems of 
Popular Participation ^
A major problem to be faced In considering the creation of 
appropriate local level common property resource management 
institutions is of how to enhance the participation of all people 
who will be affected by the action^ of such institutions in both 
the institution building process hnd in its subsequent functions.
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Several recent studies suggest that there is an increasing amount 
of differentiation among the rural peasantry. Evidence indicates 
that, for instance, it is only a minority of communal farmers 
(about 10%) who have benefited most from the support measures for 
small scale agriculture and who are responsible for the much 
publicised increase in the peasant share of national marketed 
output (Jackson and Collier, 1988; Weiner, 1988; Cliffe 1988; 
Amin, 1990; Cousins 1990). This differentiation among the 
peasantry has not received much official recognition. As Brand 
puts it:
" Whereas the new Zimbabwean leadership has understandably 
been acutely aware of racial disparities and some of the 
associated rural/urban differences, it has shown little 
awareness of differentiation or inequalities within the 
communal areas themselves. ... While there might be 
sensitivity about the position or influence of large 
commercial farmers, there appears to be little about that of 
bigger peasant faimers or rural businessmen. Master farmers 
and successful cash farmers are held up instead as models to 
be emulated, without questions being asked, for example, 
about how some of them managed to gain access to more arable 
land than others in the community " (Brand, forthcoming).
Economic differentiation among households is a direct result of 
the integration of local and national economies and has important 
implications for local resource management. In most of rural 
Zimbabwe, differentiation among "peasant" households is the 
result of households responding differently to the opportunities 
offered by new markets for agricultural produce, wage labour 
opportunities in the urban areas, education , and the adoption of 
new technologies. Thus while some peasants continue practising 
essentially subsistence agriculture, some are increasingly 
becoming commercial operators. This stratification will suggest 
the development of different production rationales and management 
styles. Such production strategies and management styles also 
indicate different perceptions of and actions regarding the 
utilization of common properties (Lawry: 1988,53).
Efforts to develop local organizations for managing common 
resources in situations where interests of the commons users are 
becoming increasingly divided by different economic orientations 
are likely to be complicated by the tendency for commercialising 
groups to reduce, and not enhance, their obligation to smaller 
holders (Esman and Uphoff, 1984).
Lawry (1988) cites research on changes in communal grazing tenure 
in Botswana (Behnke, 1984; Peters,1983) to illustrate how large 
stock-holder commercial operators have attempted to restrict 
access of small holders to communal grazing through exercise of 
control over water rights.
"The commercially successful will attempt to reinforce their 
new superiority by acquiring private use rights to land that 
in theory is still communally owned" (Behnke, 1984: in
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Lawry, 1988;56).
Scoones and Wilson (1989) suggest an economic cost-benefit 
analysis to explain arable expansion into grazing (i.e. into the 
commons) in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. They observe that 
such expansion has tended to be more rapid in the overpopulated 
high potential areas in natural regions ii and iii, and in the 
ares of spontaneous settlement in the North (mostly the Zambezi 
Valley). In these areas, returns on opening up of arable land 
will probably remain higher than the costs of reduced grazing 
(for both domestic stock and wildlife). Scoones and Wilson also 
observe that the enclosure of common grazing land is occurring on 
a mostly small scale around homesteads and sometimes around areas 
of old abandoned fields. They cite four principal ways in which 
the "invasion of the commons" is occurring:
1. The incorporation of lands adjacent to existing holdings, 
drainage and path lines in a continuation of madiro (an 
ideology of individual freedom to counter colonial 
technocratic control that came into existence during the 
liberation war). "This expansion is mainly done by resource 
rich farmers, for whom arable land is a severe production 
constraint ".
2. The opening up of new fields in the grazing area, 
usually by young men who cannot wait for their inheritance 
of land or whose existing inheritances are too small, 
sometimes with the local authority's (sabhuku, chief, VIDCO 
chairperson, councillor etc) illegal authority.
3. Direct "squatting" by outsiders on grazing land with 
some local permission for which illegal payments are 
sometimes made (note for instance the recent Mayambara saga, 
The Herald: 26 November, 1989). "There may often be 
resentment by local people, but again it seems that the 
right to s"urvive - even at common cost or cost to another 
community-is powerfully recognised".
4. A feature of sandy soil areas under population pressure 
is expansion into grazing land through homefields around the 
homestead. "Such homefields tend to be more productive than 
most "outfields", [because they enable the application of 
fertility inputs without transport problems and the benefits 
of homestead litter may also be considerable] and it is 
noticeable that most of the really productive farmers have 
managed to obtain homefields. ... Attempts to destroy 
homefields use, or to villagise people, will therefore have 
a negative effect on productivity" (Scoones and Wilson, 
1989; 85-7).
Another dynamic that is likely to have a profound bearing on the 
viability of local resource management institutions is the 
existence of a diffuse system of land rights. With reference to 
local grazing management regimes, Scoones and Wilson observe 
that:
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"Prior to instituting grazing regimes the issue of exclusive 
land rights has to be dealt with. Existing land rights 
involve a diffuse pattern of overlapping rights, including 
those of land spirits, chiefs, ward heads, village heads, 
local patrilineage heads and individual homesteads. Rights 
at any level never fully exclude rights at another level" 
(Scoones and Wilson, 1909;108).
The existence of this diffuse system of land rights has been 
shown to have precluded the emergence of any strong land 
management units, at least in nineteenth century Zimbabwe 
(Mukamuri, 1987; Scoones and Wilson, 1989). This evidence 
contradicts Ho 1 .Leman ' s (1999) assertion that "...wards (matunhu) 
were the basic units of land management among the Shona. . . .
Scoones and Wilson warn that the fact that wards (matunhu) are 
considered by rural people, especially among chiefly lineages, to 
be administrative units of land, is not necessarily proof that 
they are resource management units.
Lawry (1988) argues that the diversification of income earning 
opportunities and strategies within households erodes the ability 
of "traditional" authorities to exercise authority in local 
resource management issues.
"Much of [traditional] authority was grounded in economic 
roles played by chiefs within the confines of the 
subsistence economy. But with the growth of labour 
migration and off farm sources of income the chiefs' bases 
of authority have in many places been much diminished" 
(Lawry, 1988;57 ) .
This discussion raises some serious questions about the 
assumption that local communities can develop and enforce their 
own common property resource management institutions. As Lawry 
so aptly summarises the problems thus generated:
" In fact, the demise of local mechanisms for managing 
resources is for the most part attributable to the kinds of 
influences upon local communities - diversification of 
household economic strategies and economic differentiation - 
that make emergence of community rules to meet contemporary 
resource management problems increasingly problematic" 
(Lawry, 1980;58).
However, in spite of the problems of instituting local management 
of common property, it is my contention that the problems of 
managing common properties, particularly those faced by small 
holders whose livelihoods are most profoundly dependent on access 
to the commons, will not be solved by individualising common 
resource tenure. The case for a public interest in the 
improvement of the management of common property resources, 
particularly when they are of national concern as in the case of 
wildlife, cannot be overemphasised. But, as lawry argues, 
exercise of a public role should not be constrained by the ill
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founded assumption that communities can easily provide collective 
management on their own.
In the Zimbabwean context, some serious doubts have also been 
raised about the extent to which the decentralisation of local 
government will enhance local participation. The common view is 
that the new local level structures of local government have been 
created only to serve as appropriate units for the mobilization 
of local resources for centrally planned projects rather than as 
local fora for the conceptualisation, mobilisation and 
implementation of development projects. Moreover, these new 
units have no legal status and at this early stage of their 
development, are in the throes of a crisis of legitimacy. The 
capacity of such institutions as resource management units thus 
has to be carefully assessed (Murombedzi,1986; 90; Sibanda,1986) .
Brand {forthcoming) aptly states the position thus:
"VlDCOs and WADCOs are nonetheless probably here to stay. 
Like some early chiefs' or headmen's domains which were 
modified by population movements or violated through the 
ignorance or deliberate interference by colonial
authorities, but which acquired a firm de facto status, they 
are likely to become increasingly institutionalised as time 
goes on. The important questions centre on the role they 
will play as foci of community power and collective action. 
Indications thus far are not encouraging. Much will depend 
on the responsibilities and room for autonomous action which 
they aie given, beyond serving as conduits for the 
implementation of measures or projects conceived by the 
state or private development agencies, and their ability to 
serve as linkages with other local institutions."
Thus while devolution and participation are desirable goals, 
numerous problems exist which must be taken cognisance of at the 
outset before attempts are made to create new institutions for 
the local management of common properties.
Reshaping Internal___Order: Some Considerations in the
Establishment of Local Level Common Property Resource Management 
institutions
The role of local institutional arrangements in solving common 
property resource problems in the communal areas, albeit this 
will encounter some serious implementation problems, has been 
demonstrated. As Ostrom states, "..it is possible for those 
involved in a commons dilemma to arrive at a set of rules that 
enables them to keep total use within the limits of sustainable 
yield" (1987:262). It is, however, imperative that such an 
arrangement be based on a system of property rights that would 
allow such institutions sufficient scope to make decisions 
regarding the utilization and distribution of the resources at 
their common collective disposal. This suggests that the 
devolution of management of common property resources necessarily
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has to bo predicated on some change in the tenure rules to 
facilitate a concurrent devolution of property rights.
Strong evidence exists to suggest that there is more than a 
single institutional way to solve the problems of common property 
resources. Ostrom (1987) argues that while the economic 
activities of an institution "determine", to some extent, the 
development of that institution, "[The] institutional rules used 
when changing other institutional rules may play ... a large role 
in affecting the direction of future changes..." (Ostrom, 
1987:262) .
Furthermore each community's peculiar ecological, economic and 
social conditions must be important considerations in the 
establishment of local institutions. As Murphree (1990) states 
with reference to the establishment of local wildlife management 
institutions in Zimbabwe’s CLs:
"Given the particular nature of wildlife resources, viable 
management strategies for sustained exploitation often 
require a territorial base larger than that which wards have 
available. Furthermore, an ecologically sound determination 
of this territorial base may conflict with ward or even 
district boundaries. These considerations suggest a 
necessary compromise in many instances between social and 
ecological criteria, possibly including new structures of 
coalition between wards and between districts" (Murphree, 
1990:21) .
The element of the time needed to create new institutions and to 
learn how to create successful rule systems has also^been 
emphasised (Lawry,1988; Ostrom,1987). It is argued that new 
systems of management are not created by a single sweeping 
administrative reform that sets up local councils in all 
communities. The power of local communities to regulate their 
own properties is the cumulative result of trial and error 
methods that are used as villagers become more aware of the 
consequences of current rules in a process of conflict with 
competitors for the resources. Such a dialectical process will 
clarify who has access to what resources at which times and for 
what purposes (Ostrom,1907).
The capacity to monitor the results of devolution to local 
institutions at relatively low cost, the extent to which the 
local managers can directly observe how the rules they are using 
are affecting the commons, and the extent to which the rules in 
use are understood by all the participants are also major factors 
in the long run success of local management systems.
Another important consideration is that the institution must, 
over time, be able to acquire legitimacy in the view of those 
whose behaviour it seeks to regulate. Such legitimacy, in my 
view, obtains in the system of property rights that governs the 
individuals actions regarding their common properties. It is thus 
essential that the group view whatever institution that comes
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into existence as the custodian of their resources in order for 
that institution to develop the capacity to enforce the agreed 
upon rules.
*
Lawry (1909:18) points out some three important considerations in 
instituting local management of common properties:
1- Common property management schemes must incorporate 
clear incentives for individual participation. The 
distribution of common property benefits in relation to 
individual labour and other contributions must be clear from 
the beginning.
2 . Communities will welcome devolution of authority, 
particularly where it gives them preferential rights in
relat Lon to ol:hers .
3. The most effective management systems will emerge out of 
collaborative arrangements, where the state provides 
technical assistance and assists in the enforcement of rules 
agreed to by a credible inst- itution.
It. is clear that the first step needed in the establishment of 
appropriate local level common property resource management 
institutions is a process of participatory research designed to 
consult with local communities on existing resource use patterns, 
the desired changes in property rights, and the appropriate 
institutions to regulate these rights. Such a process must, in 
the final analysis, utilise local technical knowledge as far as 
possible rather than ignore its existence.
There is also a need for the institutions thus created to 
incorporate the diffuse rights systems existing within 
communities to enhance the institutions' capacity to regulate 
access and utilization and reduce potential conflict of interest.
Finally, the new institutions must be able to mutate and change 
to suit changing circumstances, technologies and respond to new 
challenges as they develop.
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